Defacto interview with Dr. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, Director of a think-tank of the French Ministry for the Armed Forces (IRSEM)
Jargal Defacto: Certainly, cybersecurity is an important topic. Around 5 years ago, I was invited to your cybersecurity course that lasted for ten days. I must say at that time I was deeply impressed with your accomplishments. I believe that Mongolia, a country with a small population, needs to utilize digital technology to empower its citizens. However, adopting such technology brings certain risks, namely an interference in election, trolls, and spread of fake news.
Two weeks ago, I attended the Eurasian Media Forum in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Interestingly, this year Steve Bannon, a White House Chief Strategist in the administration of Donald Trump, and George Galloway, a British politician and broadcaster, were invited to the Forum and discussed topics such as manipulation, trolls, and fake news. I believe that those are not country-specific issues but of global concern. In Mongolia, there were few incidents such as vote-buying, trolls, and fake news during the previous election. Thus, I would like to know if there are commonalities between interferences in the elections? Or is it country-specific?
Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer : If you carefully look into each case, you will discover both differences and commonalities among interferences in the election. In general, it is a three-step process which is called information “hack and leak”.
The first step is spreading a false, biased, or exaggerated rumor to discredit the target through mainstream media.
The second step is hacking. Hacking can be conducted either directly, on a candidate’s account, or indirectly on their close associate’s account. In Clinton’s case, her account was directly hacked. In Macron’s case, the accounts of close associates were hacked and they accumulated 21,000 professional and personal emails that were sent between 2009 to 2017.
The last step is leaking the hacked information. In France, the stolen data was leaked two days before poll closing to make it harder for the candidate to respond properly.
On the other hand, in the Macron’s case, there was an intermediary step between the second and third step which is called a ‘tentative leak’. If hackers could not find incriminating information, they modify information to make it look more scandalous. For instance, some sources claimed that Macron used cocaine, or Macron is gay. This four-step process is called “hack distort leak”.
JD: What is the best way to prevent and combat disinformation?
JV: A long term prevention is media literacy. Media literacy and critical thinking should be taught to citizens so they can assess online information. Though, it would only produce an effect after 5 to 15 years.
A short term solution is to create an institution. In France, the Council of State (“Conseil d’État”), a temporary institution, was set up and was in charge of ensuring equity and neutrality of the election. On the night of the leak, the Conseil d’État took action in a timely manner and produced a brief press communication in which it urged all media not to report the content of leaked information. The media worked in collaboration by only spreading the news that there was a leak and did not reveal the content of the leak. Therefore, it was eye catching for the public, and at the same time, less harmful for the candidate.
In the US, there are no neutral institutions that assess online content. Obama did not intervene in the electoral process so he would not give the impression that he is supporting Clinton, and many were confident that Clinton would win. This is an indication that the government can not act neutrally and independently. Hence, there must be an independent and neutral body that can assess online content and take appropriate measures. Currently, both the US and Canada are considering the creation of an independent body. The Canadian Minister of democratic institutions, Karina Gould, mentioned that Canada is planning to establish an independent body modeled on the French Conseil d’État during her interview with the IRSEM.
JD: To sum it up, the first solution is media literacy, the second is the development of an independent body. What is the third solution?
JV: The third is a swift reaction of civil society. It can be said that the state is biased in a certain sense and thus, the civil society, including NGOs, think tanks, and media, can independently assess and take measures against misinformation. There are two types of actions civil society could take. One is a fact-checking. It can be done by directly interviewing candidates, or by labelling information as false, true, or unverified. However, fact-checking is not enough because we are facing not only information warfare, but also narrative warfare. Not all people are interested in facts but in exciting stories, regardless of reliability. Therefore, a civil society can develop narratives to counter disinformation. To illustrate, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (“DFRLab”)identifies, exposes, and explains disinformation. For instance, when the DFRLab finds a Twitter account that is behaving in a suspicious way, they demonstrate that it is a fake account, or it is under Bellingcat’s investigation. As people are curious about who is spreading the fake news, what are the underlying objectives or which country is behind those actors, the Bellingcat develops narratives around that.
JD: Is it indeed true that the Russians made a chemical attack in the UK?
JV: It is true. The Bellingcat demonstrated that two tourists with fake identities were behind the attack. They found out that one is a colonel and another is a doctor in the Military Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. Despite that, we should not be paranoid by Russia, or we should not focus on one state, and instead, we should focus on methods to prevent it.
JD: How can we encourage and enhance the joint efforts of democratic countries to combat disinformation?
JV: That is an excellent question. We can plan and organize international meetings more frequently. At this moment, the majority of meetings are organized by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. It is a meeting point for intellectual exchange between participants who are engaged in the diverse fields of strategic communications. During the first few years, it mostly involved participants from North America and Europe but in recent years, the number of participants from Asia is rapidly growing. Moreover, other meetings are also being held in Prague, Washington DC, and Singapore. To solve the global security challenges, we need to facilitate an exchange between East and West.
JD: It was quite interesting to work with you all. Thank you.
JV: Thank you so much.